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1.

Introduction

A simplifying assumption of the "new home economics" rertili ty
demand model is that parents produce the same quality level for each
child; i.e. there are neither favorites nor Cinderellas. 1 Yet numerous
studies indicate systematic differences in the apparent "quality" of
children within families, according.to their birth order.
first-born children, there is a near-consensus:

Regarding

they have systematically

higher IQ's than their yO\mger siblings; they attend school longer and
earn more than middle-born children.

Some, but not all, studies report

an advantage of last-born children; they stay in school longer and score
higher on achievement tests than middle-borns. 2
Do such findings contradict the model in which utility-maximizing

parents jointly "plan" child quantity and quality, seeking to minimize
variance in quality? 3 An explanation based on some genetic advantage

1R. J. Willis, "A
New Approach to the Economic Theory of Fertility
Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, 81:2, Part 2 (March/April, 1973),
S-14-S64; Gary S. Becker and H. Gregg Lewis, "Interaction Between Quantity
and Quality in Children," JPE, 84 (August, 1976), S143-S162.
2
studies of birth-order effects are reviewed in the next section.

3nie critical feature or the mdel or Willis and or Becker and Lewis
is that or interaction between N and Q (numbers or children, quality of children)
in the production or child services. The first-order conditions from their

-2of being first-born, e.g. to younger parents, could explain some of
the findings, but it is virtually impossible to test, and a whole new
choice problem arises regarding whether utility-maximiz ing parents
would invest in children according to a rule of complementing genetic
advantage or substituting for it. 4 In any event, having younger
parents at birth could not explain the advantage of the last-born
over middle children.
A more common explanation is that parents fail to see or plan
for constraints on spending-per-c hild which will occur throughout the
household's life cycle; first-borns and last-borns benefit from higher
average levels of spending because they spend a higher proportion of
childhood years in smaller families.

This explanation is clearly

inconsistent with a model in which parents jointly plan number of
children and per-child investment; assuming capital markets permit
saving and borrowing, parents could equalize spending on children
across periods.

Moreover, insofar as parental earnings increase

throughout the childrearing years of the household life-cycle, any
resource constraint represented by increasing family size could be
offset by increased earnings, and in fact the last-born child should
model include:
UN= AQITC + ApN and UQ =ANTIC+ APQ·
They make clear that the shadow prices of N and Qare each affected
by the quantity of the other chosen. However, the derivation of these
first-order conditions, and the interactive term in each shadow price,
depends on the assumption that parents provide equal inputs to "quality"
for each child. Without this assumption, the inclusion of Nin the
shadow price of Q would make no sense. Nin this context simply mul
tiplies the shadow price Ile by the number of children; the shadow price
represents the average cost of increasing the quality of one child by
one unit.
--

4
Gary S. Becker and Nigel Tomes, "Child Endowments and the
Quantity and Quality of Children," JPE, 84 (August, 1976), Sl43-S162.

-Jbe better off than the first-born.

Differences across families in the

extent of birth-order effects by income could reflect differential
access to capital markets; but as long as birth-order effects persist
even in families with presumably unlimited access to such markets, we
have not explained away the phenomenon of systematic birth-order
differences, at least not in a framework of joint planning by parents.
A third line of reasoning explains child quality differences
within families in terms of the extent to which a child must share
not only the financial resources, but also the time of parents, with
siblings.

This idea is inherent in the "confluence" theory developed

by psychologists, according to which the ratio of all other family
members' ages to the child's age influences positively child develop
ment.5
Is _the strong assumption that all parents face imperfect capital
markets, and thus financial constraints, necessary for the quality
quantity parent-planning model to hold up in the face of birth-order
differences?

An

objective of the model developed below is to show

that even given perfect capital markets, birth-order differences are
likely in families in which parents are maximizing utility and seeking
to minimize differences in quality amongst their children.

The key to

such differences is the time constraint parents face--time, unlike
money, cannot be saved across periods.

In fact, as will be shown, the

existence of birth-order effects lends weight to the argument that time
inputs are important in the childrearing process.
5R. B. Zajonc, "Family Configuration and Intelligence," Science,
192 (16 April, 1976), 227-236; and R. B. Zajonc and G. B. Markus,
"Birth Order and Intellectual Development," Psychological Review, 82
(April, 1975). The confluence theory is explained further, below.

-4Time can be traded for money in the market; thus mother's
participation in the paid labor market is relevant.

A notable predic

tion of the model is that birth-order effects are less likely among
children of working mothers; this is because mothers spendin& time in
the labor market outside home throughout the childrearing years can
always make the necessary marginal shifts to keep the shadow value of
their time of equal value in all periods.

They can shift out of the

labor market as the family grows (assuming total flexibility of working
hours) and back in as older children leave the household.
If the mother does not work, the model indicates birth-order
effects are likely as long as goods and mother's time are not easily
substituted for each other in rearing children.

It suggests that

birth-order effects will only occur if childrearing is a sufficiently
time-intensive process so that the time constraint parents face is
binding.

And it implies, given the existence of birth-order effects,

limitations on the jointness of production of child quality; at the
very least, it is clear that raising two children of given "quality".

talces more time than raising one.

The next section is a review of the literature dealing with
birth-order effects.

A third section presents the model.

In a final

section, an empirical test of the model is described, and empirical
estimates are presented.
2.

Prior Literature

Differences in achievement according to order of birth have long
been noted.

In 1874 Sir Francis Galton, in his English Men of Science,

suggested "academic primogeniture" as the reason for the large proportion

-5-

6
of first-borns among the eminent men he studied.
suggested in his American Men of Letters:

In 1912, E. L. Clark

Their Nature and Nurture

that first-borns ' advantage might be due to a depletion of family
resources by the arrival of later children; this so-called "economic"
explanation was also proposed in a 1968 article in the American Journal
8
of Sociology. 7 Along with the genetic "uterine fatigue" notion, these
were, however, generally mentioned as ad hoc explanation s, rather than
as testable hypotheses; indeed they were proposed explanation s for
a casually-ob served but not carefully-m easured phenomenon.
Until recently, formal studies of the birth-order question have
been plagued with two difficultie s.

One has been sample selection.

Typical groups for study have been college students and eminent
scientists. 9 Such studies were based on samples selective in terms
of the dependent variable, e.g. education attained.

The procedure

has been to compare the proportion of first-borns in the sample to
6

The Galton study is cited by Vlilliam D. Altus, "Birth Order
Science, 151 (7 January, 1966), 44-49.
Sequelae,"
Its
and
'1

'Clark's book (Columbia University Press) is also cited by
Altus. The 1968 article is that of Bert N. Adams and Miles T. Meidam,
"Economics, Family Structure and College Attendance, " AJS, 74 (November,
.
1968), 230-239.
8

Referred to by Alan E. Bayer, "Birth Order and College Attendance, "
Journal of 1farriage and the Family, 28 (November, 1966), 480-484.
9
E.g. Stanley Schachter, ["Birth Order, Eminence and Higher
Education," American Sociologica l Review, 28 (October, 1963), 757-767]
who studied a small group of University of Minnesota students. Altus
refers to analysis by Nichols (unpublishe d) of the scores of top
finalists in the United States National Merit Scholarship Qualificati on
Tests, and to his own data on students at the University of California,
Berkeley and Santa Barbara campuses.

-6that in the population.

But this procedure poses several problems.

As one observer put it:
Changes and fluctuations in the marriage rate, age
at marriage, completed family size, age of mother
at first and last births, spacing of children, age.
structure of the population and size of the popu
lation may all affect the proportion in a given
ordinal position in a sample at any point in time. 10
If all persons in a sample are of the same age, cohort changes in
education will affect representation of persons of certain birth-order
positions.

For example, first-borns of any given age are likely to

have younger parents than later-borns of the same age.

If younger

parents are on average better-educated than older parents, first-borns
may be overrepresented in college classes, not because they are
first-borns but because they have better-educated parents on average. 11
Similarly, if there is a current annual increase in the proportion of
first-borns going to college, first-borns will be overrepresented among
college students,~ if within families there will be no differences
across children, i.e. later children will also attend.

And if within

families, later-born children actually have a real advantage, but there
is an annual increase in the proportion of all high-school graduates
going to college, no differences among college students by birth-order
will emerge. 12

10

Bayer, p. 483.

11

Adams e.nd Meidam suggest younger parents are more likely
to be white-collar rather than blue-collar workers (p. 238).
12

Albert I. Hermalin, "Birth Order and College Attendance:
A Comment," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 29 (August, 1967),
417-421.

-7-

With these types of samples, moreover, the control for family
size is critical.

As explained below, being first-born is highly

correlated with having few siblings; thus an apparent advantage of
first-borns may be merely due to the advantage children from.small
families may enjoy.

Thus a second and related

difficulty of early studies has been confinement of tests to two and
three-way cross-tabulations.

Attempts to control for family size (and

for socio-economic class, on the grounds that it might be highly and
negatively correlated with family size) were often restricted to two
13
or three family size or socio-economic class groups.
For these reasons, until the mid-1960s, the focus of studies
was on whether differences by birth-order were a real phenomenon, and
attention went primarily to the hypothesized advantage of first-borns.
Differences_ were reported in some studies but not in others, and the
question remained unresolved. 14
More recently, however, the availability of much larger samples
and the use of the computer to facilitate analysis of them, have
permitted more careful tests.

In particular, the large s~Tiples have

improved the results even using simple cross tabulations, by allowing
13Bayer; Ben Barger and Everette Hall, "The Interrelationships
of Family Size and Socioeconomic Status for Parents of College Students,"
Journal of 1furriage and the Family, 28 (May, 1966), 180-187.

14

Studies reporting no significant relationship between ordinal
position and attainment include Barger and Hall; Nichols (cited by
Altus); and Altus' study of Santa Barbara college students. Schachter;
Adams and Meidam; and Bayer among others report an advantage for
first-borns. Bayer mentions a 1933 Handbook of Child Psychology
article by Harold Jones (ed. Carl Murchison) in which Jones lists
100 studies of birth-order differences, and no consensus regarding
their existence.

-8-

examination of birth-order differences within all possible sibship
size groups.

And in most of these large samples, the dependent

variable has been a score on a test of some kind rather than educa
tional attainrnent; 15 such scores may provide a more finely-tuned (if
still imperfect) measure of child "quality."
Bayer examined birth-order differences among 45,000 United
States high school students who took several achievement tests. 16
His was one of the early reports that last-borns, as well as first
borns, had an advantage over middle-borns.

However, he included

children from two-child families, so that all middle children were
from larger families, and the f8.JI)ily size control was imperfect.
Belmont and Marolla 17 examined 400,000 19-year-old Dutch persons
who took a battery of tests; within all family size groups they found
monotonically decreasing scores by order of birth.
Zajonc reviewed evidence from large samples of Dutch (the same
data as in Belmont and Marolla's work), U.S., Scottish and French
children.

He attributed the lesser decline in scores with order of
,o

birth among the French and Scottish to greater spacing.io

In those

15
zajonc reports results of studies based on the Raven test
(in the Netherlands); the National Merit Scholarship Qualification
Test (in the U.S.); an IQ test (Gille) (in France); and the Stanford
Binet test (in Scotland) (p. 228).
16
These .data were collected in 1960 as part of the Project
Talent study.
17
Lillian Belmont and Francis A. Marolla, "Birth Order, Family
Size and Intelligence," Science, 182 (14 December, 1973), 1096-1101.
18
Zajonc, pp. 229-230.

-9groups, in fact, he reports a U-shaped relationship, i.e. middle-born
children do least well.
These samples exposed contradictory results regarding any
advantage for later-borns.

But in a careful analysis of about 200,000

Israeli eighth-grade students, Davis, Cohan and Bashi 19 proposed a
resolution of that question.

They divided their sample between children

of European and Oriental parents.

For the former group they reported

the standard result of decreasing scores with increasing order of birth.
For the latter group, they found increasing scores for later-borns from
families of four or more children.

They rejected Zajonc's proposal

that greater spacing explains a lesser advantage for early-borns, since
birth intervals were probably smaller, not greater, in the larger
Oriental families.

They proposed instead that later-borns did better

in the Oriental families because they had the benefit of help from
older siblings; and that the relative value of this help increases
the lower the education of parents. 20

Oriental parents were assumed

to have lower average educational attainment than European parents.
Their idea is of particular relevance for studies of birth-order

effects using developing country data, such as this one for Colom-

bia.

In many developing count~ies, educational opportunities· have

been increasing rapidly (as is the case for Colombia),
19
Daniel J. Davis, Saul Cohan and Joseph Bashi, "Birth Order
and Intellectual Development: The Confluence Model in the Light of
Cross-Cultural Evidence," Science, 196 (24 June, 1977), 1470-1472.
20
This idea might explain Altus' report that i~ Nichols' data
on U.S. high school students who took the National Merit Scholarship
Qualification test, statistically significant higher scores for first
borns showed up only within the group of top finalists. Across all
students taking the test, no such difference was found. See footnote
14 above.
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so that older children's education often exceeds that of their parents.
These analyses have established differences in achievement by
order of birth as widespread, if of varying patterns.

I know of no

effort, however, to develop and test a theory of the determinants of
such differences.

As noted above, a popular ad hoc explanation is the

"economic" one--that parents run out of resources with successive
children; why parents would not borrow across periods to equalize
spending on different children has not been considered.

Social

psychologists have proposed that first-borns do better because of
greater "dependence" and orientation to "adult norms, 1121 but these
ideas are difficult to test empirically.
A more parsimonious explanation is Zajonc's "co.;nfluence"
theory. 22

Intellectual environment in the home is defined as the

average of the absolute intellectual levels of all family members;
the intellectual level of family members is simply measured by their
age.

Children's intellectual development is a function of the home

"intellectual environment," and thus of the average age of family
members.

The average age of the family falls as more children are

born, so early-born children are better off.

This confluence theory

can be reconciled with the reversal of effects when parents have low
education, as in the Israeli data, if intellectual environment is
defined in terms of average years of education of family members,
instead of average age.

The confluence theory does not refer explicitly

to time inputs to children of different birth orders, though it can
21

c. Norman Alexander, Jr., "Ordinal Position and Social
Mobility," Sociometry, 31 (September, 1968), 285-293.
22

zaJonc,
·
p.

22? •
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clearly be interpreted in terms of time inputs of parents (and siblings).
In ~y event, no explicit test of the theory has been proposed.
In a study of family size and birth-order, Lindert comes closer
to a formal test of a theory. 23 He hypothesizes that both financial
resources and time determine differences among children. 24 He uses
only predicted differences in time inputs in his empirical analysis,
with the predicted differences being derived from time use data.
Unfortunately, the analysis itself does not provide a test of differ
ences specific to birth-order because of the particular procedure he
follows.

He measures the difference between first and middle-borns

in families with six or more children; he then uses dummy variables

to compare this difference to differences for children in groups which
combine both other birth-order positions and other sibship sizes.

He

thus mixes birth-order and family size effects. 25
In a paper concerned with differences across rather than within
families in children's achievement, Hill and Stafford argue that most
family background variables_that are used to explain such differences,
including family size, are actually no more than a reflection of
differential parental time inputs to children. 26

Could time inputs

23i.indert, Fertility and Scarcity in .America, Ch. 6 and
Appendix C. See also his earlier version of that chapter, "Family
Inputs and Inequality among Children," University of Wisconsin
Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper (October, 1974).
24
Lindert, Fertility and Scarcity in .America, pp. 201-204.
25

Ibid., Table 6-J, p. 196.

26
C. Russell Hill and Frank P. Stafford, "Family Background and
Lifetime Earnings," paper presented at the Econometric Society meetings,
San Francisco, 1974. See also Leibowitz, AER.

-12explain both differences within families by children's birth-order,
and by implication, differences across families by family size?

This

question is the basis for the model and the empirical tests which
follow.

3.

A Birth-Order Model

The model is specified for mothers working outside the home
and those not.

For simplicity, it is assumed that the father devotes

no time to the care of children (not a terribly strong assumption,
27
based on time use data from household surveys).
Substitutes for mother's care time (including servants, baby
sitters, relatives who help care for children) can be purchased from
non-parents, but to raise a child, some input of mother's time is
required in every period. Time inputs of older siblings may be
28 but are not explicitly modelled.
important,
27
Robert E. Evenson and Elizabeth K. Quizon, "Time Allocation
and Home Production in Philippine Rural Households," (paper presented
at International Center for Research on Women workshop, Elkridge,
Maryland, April 1978) report that fathers in a swuple of rural Filipino
households devote an average of 20 minutes per day to child care
(Table 1, p. 4). Further, in their sample, fathers' child care time
does not increase with increases in the number of children (Table 4,
p. 12). Father's time in nonphysical care of children in a 1967 U.S.
sample was .J hours per day (Kathryn E. Walker, "The Potential for
Measurement of Nonmarket Household Production with Time-Use Data,"
paper prepared for International Sociological Association IX World
Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, Sweden, April 1978, p. 17). Gilbert
G. Ghez and Gary S. Becker [The Allocation of Time and Goods Over
the Life Cycle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975)) find
with U.S. data a slight increase in working hours of men with increases
in family size (Table Jl, pp. 98-99), presumably because of greater
family needs and/or because the wife drops out of the labor force to
increase her childrearing time. Such specialization implies men's
child care time does not increase as family size increases.

28Da.
v1 s, Cohan, and Bashi.

-13The father's wage and hours of work are assumed invariant with
respect to number of children and the mother's work hours and wage. 29
An important simplifying assumption of the working-mother

version is that she can adjust her hours of work in the market at
will across periods.

The implication of relaxing this assumption is

elaborated on below.

Her wage is also assumed constant across periods,

though an increasing wage can be built into the model, and the impli
cation for birth-order effects is straightforward .
across periods in both versions of the model.

Prices are constant

Genetic endowment of

children is assumed not to vary in any way related to birth order.
The model does not allow for joint production in the use of mother's
time to raise children, nor does the childrearing productive efficiency
of mothers increase with parity or time.
Working mother version
The model takes parents' number of children as given.

Recall

the model of the preceding chapter, in which parents maximized a
uti j i ty i'u,nct.1 nn

U = U( N, Q, Z)

where N was number of children, Q average quality, and Zan index
of other commodities.

This model, in contrast, is conditional on

290r1ey Ashenfelter and James Heckman, ("The Estimation of Income
and Substitution Effects in a Model of Family Labor Supply," Econometrica,
42 (January, 1974), 73-86] find a zero elasticity of men's hours of work
with respect to wife's wage (p. 74). Ghez and Becker, pp. 98-101, report
that in the U.S. men with more children work more hours, but the increase
in their hours is small.

-14N. 30 Parents maximize utility according to the function

u

C

Vqi, S)

U(~qi,
1

where qi refers to the quality of the ith child and i (i=l,
is the order of birth (aU/aiqi
.
1

among children (aU/aVqi
of living (au;as

>

<

> O);

• n)

Vq.1 is the variance in quality

O); and S represents the parents' standard

o).

The mother produces quality in children according to the
production function
m

qijk "' Ykf( tij' xi.i) ; Iqi =

jll

qiJ

where tij is mother's time inputs to the ith child in the jth period
{j=l,

• m) and xij are purchased inputs to the ith child in the

jth period, including goods and the time of persons other than the
mother in child care which mothers purchase.

yk (k=l, ••• r) is an

efficiency parameter which declines with the age of the child such that
the marginal product of time and goods is greater the younger the child.
This is consistent with the findings of many studies of children's
physiological and psychological development indicating the importance
of the early years.3 1 The efficiency parameter is not required to
30
A complete fertility model would explain N jointly with
average Q and minimized variance in Q among children. See below,
p. 86, for reference to an additional dimension, spacing of children.
31
Alan Berg, The Nutrition Factor (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1973), discusses malnutrition in infants, the
resultant loss of "learning time . • • during the most critical·
periods of learning" (p. 10) and the question of the reversibility
of its damage (pp. 9-10 and references, p. 249).

-15generate some birth-order effects; in a family of three or more children,
the model predicts that middle children are worse off than first and
last-born without this

11

y-factor."

Without they-factor we would

predict, however, no difference between first and last-born.
To simplify the exposition, in the case shown here a new child
is born into the household in each time period, and the duration of
time periods corresponds exactly to the duration of developmental
phases, or y-factors.

Thus for this case spacing of births is fixed

in relation to developmental phases.

The actual relation between

spacing and birth-order effects can be shown to be a function of the
y-factor, as is explained below.3 2
The production function for Sis

where xs and ts represent goods and time in each of the j periods.
Utility is maximized subject to these production functions and
the following constraints, numbering m+l:
,
,- '
l l. J to l m'J:

and

m+l:

.. + tpj + tsj
tj = rt
. 1J
1
V

= -Ewt . + PxX + PsS
j PJ

32Also, for the case shown, there are. enough time periods
. m), and there are not so many developmental periods,
(j=l,
such that all children pass through all the developmental phases
(k=l, • . . r). Thus the number of time periods equals or exceeds
the number of children plus r-1 "y-factors" (m>n+r-1); by the last
period, the last child has completed the last developmental phase and
older children have left the household in sequence. The model is thus
outlined for "completed childrearing." In real life, of course, the
number of time periods is limited only by the life expectancy of parents
and the restriction that a period cannot be shorter in duration than
9 or 10 months. With 5 y-factors and 10 children born 18 months apart,

-16-

where rtij is total time devoted to the children present in the jth
i

period; tpj is time spent working in the "paid" labor market; tsj is
time spent producing S; Vis husband's earned income plus household
unearned income; w is the wage; and Px and Ps are the prices .of goods
Thus in each period,

used in production of child quality and of S.

the mother is constrained by total available time in that period.

The

income constraint, on the other hand, is not period-specific ; parents
face no capital market imperfections, so that goods can be traded freely
across periods.
Given the utility function, production functions and constraints,
we wish to show
r_q1·=1
J

>

rq
. n

>

J

rq.
. 1= 2
J

33
n-1

i.e. that the first-born child receives more time and goods than the
last-born and middle-born children, and the last-born more than the
middle-born.

The model is worked through here for the 3-child case,

with 2 efficiency parameters and 4 periods.

Appendix A outlines the

model for then-child, r-pararneter, m-period case.
With n=3, m=4 and r=2 there are 26 first-order conditions, with
time
2 , A3 and A4 representing the
constraint in each of the 4 periods, and A5 representing the income

the Lagrangean multipliers Al'

A

constraint:
we thus require at least 14 18-month time periods (21 years) for
parents to complete the childrearing process.
33It is also true that middle-born children (i=2, ••• n-1)
can differ in total quality, depending on the number of y-factors,
their magnitude, and spacing. The relationship between spacing and
y-factors is discussed below.
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(2)

ar
y

2

--

atl22

Uql22

= "2

= "

(6)

Y2

elf

-clt342

3

Uq342

elf

axlll

= "p

5

X
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= A p

5
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ax342
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[
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sj
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]
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(22)

tj=l

= tlll

+

tpl

(23)

tj=2

= tl22

+

t221

+

tp2

+

ts2

( 24)

t.J= 3

= t232

+

t331

+

tp3

+

ts3

(26) V =

-rwt .
j

PJ

+

PxX

t

+

+

sl

PsS .

The solution is straightforward.

From (13), (14), (15) and (16)

i.e. the mother's marginal value of time is equated in every period to
ht:r w1:1~t: .1:i:1tt:.

other.

It follows that conditions (1) to (6) a.re equal to ea.ch

Thus

Also, conditions (7) to (12) are equal to each other, so that

Y af =y
ar
=y
elf =y
elf =y
elf =y elf
1 ax111
2 elX122
1 elX221 2 ax232
1 elX331
2 -ax_3_4_2 ·

-20It follows that

3f'
Y1

Y1

atlll
Jf

at221

3f
yl
at331

+

Y2

3f
atl22

+

Y1

+

Y2

ar
3t2J2

+

yl

+ y

3f
2 3t342

+ y

a,
axlll

ar
ax221

ar
1 oXJJl

and there are no birth order effects.

+

Y2

+

y2

+ y

3f

=

ax122
Zlf

=

ax232

3f
2 clXJ42

34

Thus with the mother able to

adjust her working hours so that the marginal value of her time in
every period is the same as the marginal value of her wage, there are
no birth-order effects.

The time constraints do not affect child quality

because the mother can "trade 11 market time for child care time as child
care demands change across periods.
Non-working mother version
Non-working mothers have the same utility function and child
They face m+l constraints:

quality production
( 1) to

Cm):

tJ = rt ..
i lJ

+

t .
SJ

and
34 Th ·
tha·t
.
. 11es
1s equa11• t y imp
tlll= t221= t331

>

t122= t2J2= t342, a nd

X111= X221= XJJl > X122= X232• XJ42 '

Other combinations are possible, however. If t 111 > t 221 , then
in an exactly compensating amount in production, and
< x
x
221
111
similarly with time and goods inputs to children in other periods.
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For the 3-child, 4-period, 2-efficiency parameter case, first
order conditions (1)-(12) are the same as in the working mother model.
Subsequent first-order conditions are:

(13)

Utsl

(17)

auas
as a~xsj

=

Al ;

=

[Ut SJ.

=

au
a'S"
at~
. ]
SJ

"'-5Ps

J

(18)

tj=l

( 22 )

V = PxX + PsS

a.

=

tlll

+

\1

The case of perfect substitution
Only under unrealistic conditions will this model not predict

the emergence of birth-order effects.

One such unrealistic case is

-22that of perfect substitution between time and goods inputs in the child
quality production function.3 5 With perfect substitution, first-order
condition (1) is equal to (7), as are (2) and (8), (J) and (9),

(4) and (10), (5) and (11) and (6) and (12).

Since conditions (6)

to (12) equal each other, it follows that conditions (1) to (6) equal
each other.

Thus Al= A2 = AJ = A4 , i.e. the marginal value of time

is the same in each period, even for the non-working mother; since
she can substitute goods for time freely in apparently time-short
periods 2 and 3, when both children are present, the time constraint
built into the model becomes irrelevant.
b.

The time-intensity of child quality production
Similarly, birth-order effects would not be predicted if inputs

or

(111uU1er' s) time were insignificant compared to x inputs in the

production function.

First-order conditions (1) through (6) can be

written:
af

y

k

at~{~

,._c)-U•

Uq. "k
1J

= A.
J

A. > 0
J

If child quality production is highly goods-intensive ,. the marginal
product of time-inputs is rapidly driven to zero and Aj equals zero,
i.e. the time constraint is not binding.

(Strictly speaking, this

can o~ly occur where the demand for mothers' labor in the market is
zero; otherwise the mother would work outside the home.

35

However, it

It is also possible that goods and time are complementary
inputs. This is plausible if we include another factor in the pro
duction function, e.g. the child's innate ability. Complementarity
between goods and time would enhance the advantage of first and last
borns.

-23is possible to imagine situations in which entry costs (e.g. additional
education or training) are high enough or hours in the paid labor
market inflexible enough, so that women stay home even when the
marginal product of their time in producing Sor q is zero.

Thus

women with teen-age children appear to have time on their hands;
indeed it is precisely when children reach older ages that it is
likely they are no longer time-intens ive.3 6 )
c.

The constant returns to scale assumption
A more plausible assumption is diseconomie s of scale in produc

tion, whereby a reduction of inputs (to any one child) will reduce
quality by proportiona tely less.

Diseconomies in this sense are

similar to an assumption of diminishing returns to additional inputs
of time and goods to any one child.

Imagine that the child's

"endowment" (e.g. ability) were explicitly included in the production
function; then diminishing returns to additional inputs would seem
plausible.

These diminishing returns could offset (and even reverse)

the predicted advantage of the first and last
Increasing returns to scale in inputs, on the other hand, would
increase the advantage of the first and last child.
Assuming there are diminishing returns, even imperfect substi
tution and time-intens ity together do not guarantee birth-order effects.
On the other hand, if there are increasing returns, we could expect
36
Gronau ["Leisure, Home Production and Work--The Theory of the
Allocation of Time Revisited," National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper no. 137 (1976), pp. 30-31] notes that the goods-inten sive
riature of children becomes more explicit as they grow older. See also
his "The Effect of Children on the Housewife's Value of Time," Economics
of the Family, ed. Theodore W. Schultz (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1974), especially pp. 472-486.

-24birth-order effects even given perfect substitutio n and time-intens ity.
d.

Joint production

and qi_- 2 , .••• n
or q._
Joint production of either Sand q.,
1-1
1
could also offset birth-order effects. If the mother can simultaneou sly
"produce" quality in two children, or simultaneou sly produce child
quality and other corrnnodities, the difference between the first and
second periods evaporates.

Some element of joint production is not

implausible , e.g. if when mothers read to two children, each derives
the full benefit of her time, or if mothers combine child care with
food preparation .
Here there is no confounding syrrnnetry; joint production could
eliminate the predicted advantage of first and last-barns, but would
not enhance the situation of middle-barn s.
On

the production side birth-order effects are thus predicted

as long as we accept the production assumptions of the standard (Willis;
Becker and Lewis) ioodel of fertility, i.e. the elasticity of substitutio n between
t and x is less than inffrdte; production of child quality is time-intens ive;

there are constant returns to scale; and there is not joint production.
e.

The utility function
However, even if on the production side, none of the conditions

tending to mitigate birth-order effects obtained, sufficient distaste
for variance among children in quality could lead parents to trade off
higher average quality and/or a higher S to reduce variance and eliminate
differences by birth-order .

If there were no period-spec ific time

constraints , or if production conditions made the time constraints

-25not binding , parents could automat ically minimize variance by simply
maximizing average quality- -given diminish ing returns to parenta l .
inputs to any one child, and given that genetic endowment of children
does not differ systema tically by birth order.

However, once the time

constra int becomes binding , not only product ion conditio ns but also
the nature of the utility function will affect the extent of differen ces
among children .

Parents , depending on their preferen ces, may choose

differe ntial quality investm ents, because of the time constra int.
f.

One case predicti ng birth-or der effects
An

empiric al finding of the existenc e of birth-or der effects

has this advantag e:

for families which we can show face no capital

constra int, the persiste nce of birth-or der effects implies that
certain product ion conditio ns do not obtain.

For· example, if we bar

the possibi lity of increasi ng returns (to inputs to any one child),
then emergence of the predicte d birth-or der effects elimina tes the
joint possibi lity of perfect substitu tion, goods-i ntensity , joint
product ion, and diminish ing returns .

A .Pinniri_g ·ar

differen ces by

birth order does not allow us to distingu ish among the differen t
product ion conditio ns in terms of their relative importan ce; this
would require much more detailed data on actual time and goods inputs
to children over a conside rable period (consid er the difficu lties of
estimati ng product ion function s even for shoes or tractors ).

But the

elimina tion of certain product ion possibi lities is a finding in itself,
particu larly insofar as it points up the central ity of time use in
childrea ring.

-26To simplify exposition of how the model under certain conditions
predicts birth-order differences among children of non-working mothers,
a specific case is presented here.
scale and no joint production.

We assume constant returns to

Child quality production is assumed

to be sufficiently time-intensive so that the time constraint in each
period is binding.

Finally, substitution of goods for time is con

strained in a certain way.

First, note that from first-order conditions

( 1 ) and ( 13 ) ; ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) and ( 14); ( 4), ( 5 ) and ( 15 ) ; and ( 6) and ( 16 ) ,
the following equalities hold:

(a)

au as
=y
---1
as ats

1

(b)

( C )

(d)

af

at111

• Utlll

= Al

au as
---au as

=

v

af
at232

au as

= v

af
at342

,2

•2

= v,1

af
at331

For birth-order effects to emerge, we wish to show that A4 <Al< A2 = A3 ,
i.e. that the marginal value of time is equal in the second and third
time periods, when 2 children are present; and greater in those middle
time periods than in the first time period; and greater in the first
period, when the only child present is younger (and the marginal product
of time greater) than in the fourth period, when the only child present
is older.

With A4 <Al< A2 = A , it follows from (a) through (d) that
3
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To demon strate that

requir es, in additi on to (f) and (g), that

that comparing the first and last childr en

t111 >. t331 , the advant age
t122
t342

(f))
of the first in the period s when each is alone (alrea dy shown, see
time;
exceed s the advant age of the last, (g), in period s when they share
es
and furthe rmore that at the same (older ) age, the last child receiv
37 The first is true if A4 < Al, and
more time than the middle child.

( c) and ( d)

However, it is only possib le to show A4 <Al< A2 = A3 by
and
specif ying a limit on the degree of subst itutab ility betwee n goods
time inputs in the produ ction of Sand qijk•

Note from first- order

37
The assum ption is that orderi ng of inputs implie s orderi ng of
outpu ts.

-28conditions (7) through (12) that:

With A4 <Al< A2 = AJ' inputs of time to the first and last child will
be greater in the first and fourth period than are inputs of time to
the middle child in the second and third period.

For (h) to hold there

fore requires that

and since

r1

>

r2

The restriction on substitutability is that the reductions of goods
inputs to the first and last child in the first and fourth periods do
not raise the marginal product of time inputs to those children in
those periods to the point where those time inputs would be reduced
· to the level the middle child receives in the second and third periods.
In terms of conditions (a) through (d), this assures that if

(where i or j changes),

then tijk ~ tijk

(where i or j changes).

Similarly, in production of

S, reductions of goods-inputs in the first and fourth periods cannot
raise the marginal product of time-inputs to the point where the

-29following condition does not hold:

( j)

au as

>

au as

<

then tsj: tsj

(where j changes),

(where j changes).

In Appendix B, it is sho\m that

given conditions (i) and (j), equalities (a) through (d) from the
first-order conditions can only hold if A4 <Al< A2 = A3,
--It can also be shown that for the first and last child,
the goods to time ratio is greater in the middle periods than in the
first and last periods; and that the goods to time ratio is greater for
the first child in the first period than for the last child in the last
period, so that some of the last child's relative time loss is made up
in the last period.

All these results follow because, though the over

all goods inputs are constrained to be equal across children, parents
optimally choose different ratios of time to goods in different periods,
as the marginal value of mother's time changes across periods.
It is also clear from the model that differences between the

differences throughout a child's years of growing up, will be reflected
in birth-order effects.

The greater is y 1 relative to y 2 ••• Yr,

the greater is the advantage of the first-born.

The greater Yr relative

Yr-l' the lesser the disadvantage of the last-born.
The effect of spacing on birth-order effects depends on the
number and relative magnitudes of developmental stages through which
"children pass.
at all:

At two extremes, there would be no birth-order effects

twins (virtually zero spacing) and the situation when the

number of years between the birth of two children exceeds the number

of developmental periods, so that the second child is in the same
position regarding receipts of mother's time as was the first.
in intermediate situations, there is no simple rule.

But

On the one hand,

greater spacing (e.g. between the first and second child) increases
the time the first child has alone; on the other hand the lower the yk
of the first-born at the time of the next birth the less the disadvantage
of the second child, since the greater the difference between yk and

r1,

the greater the inputs to the new child in the critical first period.
There is one clear effect of spacing:

for a given number of

children, the greater the average spacing among children, the greater
the children's average quality.

But spacing, as mentioned above, is

limited because the childbearing and childrearing years are limited.
Spacing is also more limited the greater the number of desired children.
Thus a complete model would explain fertility demand in three dimensions:
the demand for a certain number of children, .the demand for average
quality, and the demand for minimum variance among children in quality;
and would take into account that parents may make certain accommodations
(such as spacing) as they trade off between numbers, quality, and
birth-order differences.
The contrast between the working and non-working mother versions
of the model indicates what would happen if the flexible-hours assumption
of the working-mother version were relaxed, such that mothers could not
adjust hours between periods.
tpl

= tp 2 = tp 3 = tp4 '

With the constraint that

the results are identical to the (substitution

constrained) non-working version of the model.

Mothers could offset

birth-order effects by withdrawing from market work altogether in
middle periods, but with tpl constrained to equal tp 4, the first child

-31retains an ~dvantag e over the last, because of the efficien cy paramet er.
A more typical pattern might be for mothers to leave the labor market

on the birth of the first child, and to return when all children are
older, so that, for example, tpl

= tp 2 = 0

and tpJ

= tp 4

> 0.- In this

case, the advantag e of the first over the last child is accentu ated,
and early-bo rn middle children will have an advantag e over later-bo rn
children .
Similar ly, the result of an increase in mother' s wage rate over
time (in the working -mother version ) is clear.

The margina l value of

her time will increase with each period, and later-bo rn children will
receive success ively less of her time, as Am> Am-l • • . > A1 •

The

greater the rate of increase in the wage and the greater the rate of
decrease in the y's, the worse off are later-bo rn relative to middle
born children ; their advantag e over the middle group can even be
reversed .
The fact that a steep age-earn ings profile accentu ates birthorder differen ces (in this case, the advantag e of early-bo rns)
suggest s an explana tion on the suppl~r side for the tendency of womer1

to work in occupat ions with flat age-earn ings profile s, even given
some loss in the present discoun ted value of lifetime earning s.

Given

diminish ing returns in utility to income, the decrease in margina l
utility due to an income loss associat ed with such occupat ions will
be relative ly smaller the greater the differen ce between the mother' s
potenti al lifetime income and her exogeno us income (includi ng in her
exogeno us income the income of her husband ).

In theory, then, we would

expect the advantag e of the last-bor n to be smaller the greater the
ratio of potenti al lifetime income of the wife to that of her husband .

-32Women have traditi onally opted for jobs with flexibl e hours, 38
presum ably due to childre aring demands which fluctua te over time.
Such fluctua tions are due not only to changes in the number of childre n
but to changes in the mix of develop mental cycles which childre n go
through .

Thus it may be minimi zation of birth-o rder differe nces and

maximi zation of the sum of child quality which leads women to seek
flexibl e-hour

occupa tions, and occupa tions in which tempor ary with

drawal from the labor market has low opport unity costs in terms of
lost experie nce.

If employers view all women as followi ng such a

maximi zation rule, employ er-fund ed trainin g of women will be limited
and flexibl e-hour occupa tions will have flat earning s profile s.

Thus

supply and demand effects interac t to lead women to such occupa tions.

4,

Empiri cal Estima tes of Birth-O rder Effects

Hypotheses tested here, based on the predic tions of the model,
are:

1.

That first-b orn childre n are better -off by some measure

than later-b orn childre n;
2.

That last-bo rn childre n are better off than middle -born

childre n, but somewhat worse off than first-b orn childre n, because
the extra parent al time they receive comes later in their develop ment.

38

Jobs which are compat ible with child.r earing may serve the
same purpose .

3.

That birth-ord er effects are attenuate d among children of

working mothers~
4.

That birth-ord er effects in families in which the mother

does not work are not entirely due to parents' inability to equalize
spending (for goods) across children, i.e. to imperfect ions in capital
markets, but are at least in part due to the time constrain t modelled.
Other testable predictio ns, e.g. that birth-ord er effects vary
for working mothers as a function of the availabil ity of flexible- hour
jobs, and as a function of the age-wage rate profile, are not tested
because the data set used does not include the necessary informati on.
There is support for the idea proposed in prior work on birth
order effectJ9 (but not explicitl y incorpora ted into the model) that
last-born s' relative advantage is greater in poorer families.

If in

poorer families, the education of older siblings exceeds that of the
m/"\+.h<=>T'; +.h<=>n Hm,:, inp11t.!'l nf nl

ni:>r

sibliri_gs could :provide a relativel y

better substitut e for mother's time than would siblings' time inputs
in the average family.

Education al opportun ities expanded rapidly in

Colombia in the two decades before the survey,

children are especiall y

39 navis, Cohan end Bashi; and Altus' report of Nichols' data.
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likely to be better-e ducated than their parents in families in which
parents migrated to the urban areas sampled from rural areas where
40
schoolin g was less availab le.
Finally , differen ces in birth-or der effects between children
of working and non-working mothers as a function of mother's educatio n
and father's income are discusse d.

There is some support for the

notion that mother' s educatio n is a better proxy for her price of time
if she works, and that father's income is a better proxy for her price
41
of time if she does not.
The family size problem
Most studies of differen ces in achievem ent levels among persons
accordin g to the order of their birth are concerne d also with the
effect of family size and its importan ce relative to birth order.
Unfortu nately there are difficu lties with combining analysis of
40

see Appendix B of Nancy M. Birdsal l, "Sibling s and Schoolin g

in Urban Colombia," Ph.D. disserta tion, Yale Univers ity, 1979.
41

T. Paul Schultz ["Ferti lity Differen ces Between Working and
Nonworking Wives," paper presente d at the annual meeting s of the
Populat ion Associa tion of America, Atlanta , Georgia , April 1978]
suggest s husband 's income as a proxy for the price of time of non
working wives. The assumpt ion is that market wage offers, a function
of educatio n, are independ ent of hours worked, whereas the shadow
value of time in nonmarket activiti es increase s as less time is
allocate d to them. This does not imply that educatio n has no effect
on home product ivity, only that for nonworking women, their price
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birth-order and family size effects.

Parents' demand for number

of children is one of a set of demands, another of which is for Q,
Consider a system of linear equations which

quality per child.

represents the N and Q decisions, relating achievement of an indi
vidual i to that individual's family size and order of birth:

( 1) Achievementi

=

a 0 + a1 family size + a 2birth-orderi
+

~aiXi

(2)

Family size

+

~ajZj

+

£1

J

J.

= B0 + B1(

!

achievementi/N)
1 1

where Xi is a vector of socio-economic variables influencing family
size and child achievement; the Zj are variables which influence child
achievement but not family size; the family size of an individual i
is N, so that 13 1 is

+.hP ('npf'f'i('iPnt. rm AVPT'AgP Al"hiPvPment. nf children

in a family; the Wj are variables which influence family size but not
child achievement; and £ 1 and

£

2 are error terms.

The two equations together reflect the possibility that parents'
decisions regarding family size are affected by their goals for each
..

ehlld's eventual achievement level (or, more crudely in the literature,
llquality").

As a result an ordinary least squares estimate of

of- ·time is captured better by husband's income than their own education.
Table 7 (col. 2) implies education does increase home productivity;
see discussion below.

-36equation (1) with actual family size variable entered will result in
biased parameter estimates, for two possible reasons:

£1

and

£2

are likely to be correlated, though in what direction is not clear.
We cannot observe differences across parents in fecundity or taste;
a preference for large nwnbers of children could be positively or
negatively related to a preference for child achievement-oriented
patterns of spending.

Negative correlation of

£

1 and

£

2 would cause

family size to be negatively correlated with the error term in the
achievement equation and its coefficient would be biased downward;
positive correlation would have the opposite effect.
M:>reover, the interaction model (Becker and Lewis;·w1111s) indicates
that the shadow price of investment (or achievement) per child is
lower for parents with fewer children; if £ and £ 2 are negatively
1
correlated, this interaction effect will increase further the negative
correlation between the family size variable in equation (1) and

£1 .

However, simply treating family size as an endogenous variable
using appropriate techniques does not resolve the problem as far as
analysis of birth-order effects is concerned.

If family size is

entered into equation (1) as an endogenous variable, the coefficients
on birth-order dummies indicating whether the individual was first
born, middle-born or last-born will be biased; the unexplained error
in the family size equation (2) is likely to be impounded in the
birth-order coefficients, since being a middle-born child is highly
correlated with being from a large family. Insofar as
large family size has a negative effect on educational achievement,
birth-order

dwmnies for first and last-born child.I,'en will be

42Birdsall, Chapter
II.

42

-37biased upward in a child achieveme nt regressio n, unless actual family
size is controlle d for.

As a result, it is virtually impossibl e to

obtain consisten t estimates in one regressio n of both family size and
birth-ord er effects.
For analysis of the effects of birth order, two methods of
controlli ng for family size are employed below.

The most direct is

to examine intra-fam ily differenc es, e.g. the differenc e between the
education al attainmen t (age-stan dardized) of the first or last-born
and the average attainmen t of his or her own siblings.

(This procedure

has the additiona l advantage of controlli ng for other family charac
teristics , such as parents' education , income and taste for average
quality of children, which influence the average level of attainmen t
for all the children. )

A simple test of hypothese s 1 and 2 is then

whether the intra-fam ily differenc e in achieveme nt between first-bor n
children is positive and significa ntly different from that of other
children; the analogous test for last-born s is whether the differenc e
is positive and significa ntly different from that of middle-bo rn
children.

The result of this test is shown below.

There are two disadvant ages of using intra-fam ily differenc es
to test birth-ord er effects in this sample:
1.

The sample size for the former method is small, since the

test can only be performed for those families which have a first-bor n
or last-born as well as other children in the age group 6-18.

Children

from other families whose birth order and education are known but for
whom the education of older or younger siblings is not known are thus
eliminate d.

Of 1450 families with children between the ages 6 and 18,

867 families had a first-bor n and other children; only 336 families

-38had a first-born and last-born and other children.
2.

For these families, first-borns are likely to be near the

top of the 6-18 age range, and last-barns near the bottom.

This makes

results heavily dependent on the manner in which children's educational
attainment is standardize d for age.

The extent and nature of differences

in educational attainment varies by age; among the youngest children,
enrollment rates are high, and variation in attainment is largely
a function of differences in age of beginning school and differences
in grade repetition.

Among older children, differences in

i~e age

of permanently leaving school are probably more important.

Thus a

direct comparison of older and younger children may not be reasonable.
For these reasons, a second approach is also employed below.
It is to use as the units of observation all children for whcm birth
order and education are knovm.

With a comparison of children across

all families, first-borns who are young and last-barns who are old can
be included in the analysis.

Since both first-borns and last-barns

are relatively equally distributed across all ages (with a slightly
higher proportion of first-borns among 17 And 18 year olds; and a
slightly lower proportion of last-barns among 6 and 7 year olds),
results for all children are less dependent on the age standardiza tion.
(The age distributio n of children by birth order and a more complete dis

cussion of the age standardiza tion problem are available from the author.)
Children's educational index is then regressed on dummies repre
senting birth order; to control for family size, a variable representin g
each child's actual family size, (ARAT), is included.

As explained

above, the coefficient on the family size variable (a in equation (1)
1
above) cannot be interpreted as an indication of the effect, in a

1
behavio ral sense, of family size on children s achievem ent.

It will

1
capture all associat ions between an individu al child s achievem ent and

1
family size, includin g effects of parents taste for numbers of children

and average quality in children , and effects of differen ces in fecundit y.
It thus allows a test of the existenc e of birth-or der effects_ inde
pendent of these factors.

Parents 1 average achievem ent goal for all

children obviousl y does not affect the birth order of any individu al
.child, except insofar as the achievem ent goal affects the total number
of children and children with high orders of birth must come from large
families .

As long as first and last effects are not associa ted with

family size (and they are not in these data), the coeffic ients on the
birth-or der dummies will signal whether birth-or der effects exist.
(A third approach to the family size problem is to stratify the
sar:iple by family size and examine birth-or der effects within family
size groups.

This requires elimina tion of children with mothers under

age 40, since stratify ing by children -ever-bo rn can only be done for
families in which mothers have complete d childbea ring~3

Using this

approach (not shown), dummies for first and last-bor n children are
usually positive but seldom statisti cally significa ...~t, and are in some

cases negativ e.)
The endogen eity of mother 1 s work status
The testing of hypothe sis 3 also presents difficu lties in
estimati on.

The model predicts differen ces in the extent of birth

order effects dependin g on whether the mother works outside the home.
However, supply of labor by the mother is jointly determin ed along

4 1tratify ing by ARAT is not possible because it is in effect
a continuo us variable .

-40with number of children and their quality, and thus, like family size,
should not be treated as exogenous.

A way to get around this problem

would be to predict labor force supply of mothers during the child
rearing years--but this is possible only with identifying variables
reflecting demand for mothers' labor, and such variables are not present
in this data set.

Furthermore, the data include information only on

the current labor force status of mothers, not their labor force status
over the entire period of childrearing.

Thus some mothers counted as

working may have spent most of their childrearing years at home; other
mothers counted as nonworking may have spent most of their childrearing
years working away from homef4
In the estimates below, the endogeneity of mothers' working
status is ignored; the results are of sufficient interest to warrant
more rigorous tests of the model with a better data set.
Description of sample and variables
The data analyzed are from a survey of 2949 households in urban
Colombia, in which information was collected on number and ages of
children, their educational attainment, and on income and other charac
teristics of parents.
The variable used as a measure of "quality" across children
is educational attainment. The variable is standardized for the age of children

44 ~ames J. Heckman and Robert J. Willis find using U.S. panel
data th&t there tend to be two groups of women: workers, whose
participation probabilities are near unity; and nonworkers, whose
participation probabilities are near zero ["A Beta-Logistic Model
for the Analysis of Sequential Labor Force Participation by Married
Women," JPE, 85 (February, 1977), 27-58].
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45
to permit direct comparison of children of different ages.

dependent variable is defined for children aged 6 to 18.

This

The variable

is by no means a perfect measure of the "quality" discussed in the
model.

It is an even cruder measure of quality than a score on an

achievement test of some kind.

(Test scores have been the measure

used in the more recent large-sample investigations of birth-order
differences, discussed above.)

Educational attainment is

in fact a function of the "quality" we seek to measure; the assumption
is it reflects parents' inputs of time and goods in the same way actual
"quality" of a child would.

Yet it may not; it may have a greater

goods-component than would be ideal, since schooling is purchased by
46
parents.
45

A child's educational attainment is compared to that of other
children of the same age and sex group in the sample:

EDI.1 =

4 6 -Qi

=

educational attaiTuTtenti

mean educational attainmentjs

i = child

j
s

=
=

age
sex

f(Qf, xQ. ), where Qi is education of the ith child, Qi
1

is the child's true "quality" and xQ. is money spent on education for
1

the ith child. But Q~1 = f(t.,
x.)
where t.1 and X•1 include all time
1
1
and goods inputs to the ith child, so that xi includes money spent
on education. If money spent on education affects Qi more than Qf,
then Qi may be said to have a greater goods-component than would be
ideal.

-42Of the 2949 families, 2405 had children.

The birth order of

7223 children in 2288 families could be determined with relative
accuracy, given age of children present in the household, number of
children born to the mother and still alive, her present age and her
age at marriage.

Children of women married more than once were excluded,

as were children in families where more than two children were no
longer in the household.

If one or two children of those reported

alive were not in the household, other children in that household were
included in the sample only if it was clear from mother's duration of
marriage and the ages of those children present, that the missing
children were the oldest.
Of these 7223 children, 4380 from 1450 families were between
the ages of 6 and 18; the sample is confined to children in this latter
group by the nature of the dependent variable.

It is further reduced

by the elimination of children from one-child families and of cases
where there are missing values on other variables.
Some children may be from families which are not yet complete.

least 6 years of age who had no younger siblings at the time of the
survey will probably not subsequently have younger siblings in Colombia
where births are seldom so widely spaced; even if they subsequently
47
did, for 6 or more years they would have been "last."
47

Is it problematic that first-born and last-born children at
older ages are more likely to be living at home and thus in the sample
if they are still in school, thus biasing upward achievement levels
of first and last-borns? No. Older middle-barns are also more likely
to be at home and thus in the sample if they are still in school, and
the dependent variable compares a child's educational attainment to
that of other children of the same age and sex also still at home.
Only if first and last-born children are systematically more likely

-43Table 1 lists variable s used in the cross-ch ildren analysi s,
with their means and standard deviatio ns.

(Variab les used in the

intra-fa mily differen ce analysis are defined in the tables showing
results .)

Note that only about 11 percent of mothers worked outside

the home at the time of the survey.
The family size variable used is ARAT, for "age ratio." It is
a measure of fertilit y whicn is standard ized for the biologic al relation 
ship between mother's age and fecundit y, using a natural fertilit y schedule ,
thereby permitti ng inclusio n of children in the analysis whose mothers
not have complete d childbea ring.

may

48

Results
Table 2 shows the results of a simple test of hypothe ses 1
and 2, using the intra-fa mily differen ces in educatio nal attainm ent
(age-sta ndardiz ed) between first-bo rns and other siblings ( col. 1);
first-bo rns and other siblings excludin g last-bor ns (col. 2); last
borns and other siblings excludin g first-bo rns (col. J).
Here and in the followin g tables, results for first-bo rns only
are for fw14lies with at least two children ; results which also include
last-bor ns are for families with at least three children .

The former

results compare first-bo rns to all other children (includi ng last-bor ns);
the latter results compare first-bo rns and last-bor ns to middle children .
to stay at home at older ages for reasons other than schoolin g is
there a problem. Even then it is likely that the bias would reduce
the hypothe sized effect-- since then it would be precise ly those older
middle-b orn children still in school who would be more likely to be
still living at home. In any event, a cross-ta bulation of first and
last-bor n children by age showed they are relative ly evenly distribu ted
across all ages, with a slight increase in the proporti on of first
borns in the 17 and 18 year groups only.

48see Brian Boulier and Mark R. Rosenzweig, "Age, Biologi cal Factors
and Socioeco nomic Determi nants of Fertilit y: A New Measure of Cumulat ive
Fertilit y for Use in the Empiric al Analysi s of Family Size," Demgrap hy, 15
(November, 1978), 487-498.

J
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TABLE 1
Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Samples
of CJ-.ildren from Two and Three-Child Families

EDI

Educational index: Ratio of
child's years of schooling
to mean of other children of
same age and sex

EDI2

Educational index: Difference
of child's years of schooling
and mean years of other children
of same age and sex

FRTD

First-born child dummy

Sample of
children from
families with
at least
2 children
N = 4296

So.JT1ple of
children from
families with
at least
3 children

1.01
( . 896)

1.00
( :8n)

.051
( 1.81)

.241
( .428)

N = 4082

.0329
( 1.82)

.222
( .416)

LSTD

last-born child dummy

\WiD

Dummy indicating a working wife

.112
( . 315)

.110
(. 313)

FRTWWD

First-born child/working wife
dummy interaction term

.0286
( .167)

.0250
( .158)

LSTWD

Last-born child/working wife
dummy interaction term

AGE

Age of child

SEXD

Sex of child dummy,
equals 1 for females

ARAT

sew

Fertility measure standardi_zed
for the age-fecundity relation
ship using a natural fertility
schedulea
Wife's number of years of
schooling completed

.091
(. 288)

.00931
(. 0960)
10.92
( 3. 54)

10.9
(J. 52)

.496
(. 50)

(. 50)

.498

.665

.685

( . 283)

( . 273)

6.30
( 3. 97)

6.29
(J.93)
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TABLE 1 (continued)

FRTSCWD

First-born child/schooling of
wife dummy interaction term

ISTSCVID

Last-born child/schooling of
wife dummy interaction term

Sample of
children from
families with
at least
2 children
N = 4296

Sample of
children from
families with
ai, least
3 children
N = 4082

1.61
( 3. 52)

(3. 37)

1.47

.673
( 2. 48)

Husband's income (1968 pesos,
quarterly)

( 2255)

1000.
( 2282)

FRTYHD

First-born child/husband's
income interaction term

240.
( 1168)

213.
· ( 1149)

LSTYHD

Last-born child/husband's
income interaction term

YH

a

See Boulier and Rosenzweig (1978).

1013.

129
· ( 1129)

-46TABLE 2
Mean Intra-Family Differences in Educational Attainment
(standard error in parentheses)
column 1
Types of age
standardization

First-born minus
average of other
siblings

PANEL I

-.020

(based on EDI:
ratio of child's
actual attainment
to average of child's
age-sex group

( . 033)
N = 867

column 2
First-born minus
average of other
siblings, excluding
last-born
.010

(. 060)
N = 336

.019
( . 032)
N = 218

PANEL II

.038

.039

(.015)

(. 016)

PANEL III
(based on EDI2:
difference between
child's actual attain
ment and average of
child's age-sex group

.183

.115

( . 032)
N = 800

(Tier I, excluding
6 and 7 year olds)

N = 671

column 3
Last-bcrn .::-,inus
average of other
siblings, excluding
first-born

N =

635

( . 059)

.153
(. 061)

N = 867

N = 800

-.175
( .091)
N = 336

-47Three panels are shown.

In the first, the intra-family

difference is based on an educational index which is a ratio of a
child's actual attainment to the average for the child's age-sex
group (EDI in Table 1); in the second, the same variable is used but
6 and 7 year olds are excluded; in the third, the educational attain
ment index is a difference (EDI2 in Table 1) and includes 6 and 7 year
olds.
The results are mixed, illustrating the problem mentioned above
of comparing children within families, i.e. the sensitivity of results
to the method of age standardization.

There is a tendency for young

children--in this sample, likely to be last-borns--who are at normal
grade level to have higher scores using the ratio index than older
siblings--in this sample, likely to be first-borns--who are also at
normal grade leve1~

9

Because this is especially the case with 6 and

7 year olds, their exclusion ''helps" the older first-borns.

( Compare

panels 1 and 2. )
In the third panel, the intra-family difference is based on
the index which is itself a difference between a child's actual

educational attainment and the average for the child's age-sex group.
Compared to the ratio index, this standardization gives lower relative
"scores" to younger children and favors older children.
As a result, in intra-family comparisons in which last-barns are
younger than first-borns and middle-barns, the last-barns do not

49E-.g. a 6-year-old girl who has completed one year of school
receives a "score" using the ratio index of 1/.25, where .25 is the
average years of education attained of 6 year old girls. A 10 year
old girl who has completed four years of school receives a "score"
of 4/2.60. The score of the older child is lower, though both are
at grade level.

-48appear to have any advantage (the "difference" in column 3 is negative).
First-borns (columns 1 and 2) appear to have a significant advantage.
Table 3 indicates the results of regressions using as the units
of observation all children for whom birth order and education are
lmown.

The individual child educational index is regressed on dummies

for being first-born (columns 1 and 2), and last-born (~olumns 3 and
4), with actual family size entered as a control variable.
shown are for EDI, the age-standardization based on a ratio.

(Results
Results

using EDI2, an age-standardization based on a difference, are less
pronounced. They are available from the author.)
Coefficients on the birth-order dummies (middle-born children
being the excluded group) are all positive; in columns 3 and 4 the
first-born coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level;
the last-born coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level.
However, the last-born child dWT1I'.1y coefficient is consistently greater
than that of the first-born, contradicting the prediction of the model.
Several reasons for this are possible:
1.

As mentioned above, the dependent variable has a greater

goods-component than would be ideal; it could overstate the total
advantage of the last relative to the first, if, for example, first
borns have higher IQ's than last-borns, but do not stay in school
50
longer.
2.

Last-borns are somewhat more likely to be at the young

end of the age range than at the old end; the opposite is true for
50
Lindert, pp. 201-204, argues that especially for the lastborn the difference ·in parental goods-inputs is greater than in
time-inputs. See also fn.46 above.

-49TABLE J
Child Educatio n Regress ions
(t-stati stics in parenth eses)
Dependent variable : child's educatio nal attainme nt relative
to other children in his or her age-sex group (EDI) Families with at
least 2 children , N=4296

Constan t

( 1)

( 2)

( 3)

1.44

1.44
( 39. 0)

1.40
( 34. 8)

(39. 5)

FRTD

.031
(o. 97)

.037
(1.11)

.0557
( 1. 69)
.132

LSTD

ARA.T

Families with at
least J children , N=4082

-.648
( -13. 5)

-.652
(-13.6)

(4 )
1.41
( 34. 4)
.0620
( 1. 78)
.149

(2.72)

( 2. 91)

-.624
(-12.3)

-.625
(-12.J)
-.0412

vr.·m

-.0541
(-1.10)

( -0. 80)

FRTWWD

-.0542
(-0.55)

( -0. 53 )

LSTVNlD

-.0548
F= . 67

2,4076
-.170
(-1.10)
R2 =.0466

-50first-borns.

The age standardization used in these tables favors·

slightly younger children at grade level over older children at grade
level.

J.

For families which face imperfect capital markets, a number

of factors may favor the last-born.

The last-born may benefit froffi

additional and unexpected financial resources of parents who are on
average older and have thus higher earnings when they are in school.
Last-borns in poor families may also benefit from financial transfers
of older siblings, now working, and from time inputs of older siblings.
Also, families whose future stream of income is uncertain may be more
willing to spend heavily on the last child than on earlier children.
All these factors imply that in the families (nonworking mothers) with
the highest income, that do not face imperfect capital markets, the
advantage of the last-born should be reduced.

(Birth-order effects

for high-income families are shown below. )
In columns 2 and 4, the effect of working mothers is tested.
In both cases, the working mother/birth-order dummy interaction terms
are negative as expected, suggesting

the positive

birth-order effect among children of working mothers, but they are
not significant statistically.

Based on the magnitudes of coefficients

on FRTD and FR'IWWD in columns 2 and 4, and on I.STD and I.S'IWWD in
column 4, the advantage of being first-born or last-born is more
or less eliminated when mothers work.

In Table 4, results are shown for the samples split depending
on mothers' labor force participation.

Birth-order coefficients are

positive and in column J significant for nonworking mothers; they are
not significantly different from zero for working mothers (columns 2

-51TABLE 4
Child Education Regressions--Split Sample
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent variable: child's educational attainment relative
to other children in his or her age-sex group (EDI) _
Families with at
least 2 children
(2 )
( 1)
Working
Non-Working
Mother
Mother
N=481
N=3815
Constant
FRTD

1.43
( 37. 3)
.039
( 1.16)

1. 50
( 12. 9)
-.0350
(-0. 37)

LSTD
ARAT

-0.635
(-12.7)
R2 =.0427

-0.817
(-5.05)
R2 =.0513

Families with at
least 3 children
4
3
Working
Non-Working
Mother
Mother
N=450
N=3632
1.39
(32. 7)
.0644
( 1. 85) F=5. 33
2, 3628
.155
(3.02)
-.602
(-11.3)
R2 =.0459

1.53
( 12. 0)
-.0133
( -0.14) F=.071
2,446
-.0553
(-0. 37)
-.870
(-5.03)
R2 =.0548

-52and 4).
Are such effects due solely to imperfect capital markets (or
to parents' failure to plan intertemporally?) rather than to the time
constraint which drives the model?

If birth-order effects persist

even for families we assume have good access to markets for borrowing
and saving--the families with the highest incomes--then clearly these
effects cannot be due solely to imperfect capital markets.
In Table 5 are shown the results of the Table 4 regressions
for nonworking mother families, but with the sample restricted to
children from the 20 percent of families with the highest income (in
the original sample of 2949 families).

Columns 1 and J of Table 5

correspond to columns 1 and J of Table 4.

Birth-order effects are

greater in the rich families; in Table 5 the coefficient on the firstborn dummy in column 1 is about three times greater than that in
Table 4 and is significant (at the 10 percent level).

The coefficients

on the first-born birth-order dummy in column J is also three times
greater in the rich-family sample, and the last-born coefficient is
twice as great in the rich-family sample.

Thus both first-borns and

last-borns have a relatively greater advantage in rich families, and
the relative advantage for last-barns is not as great as for first
borns.

Imperfection in capital markets does not alone explain birth

order effects.
In columns 2 and 4, the age and sex of the child are controlled
for.

Since the dependent variable is standardized for age (and sex),

interpretation of an age coefficient entered linearly is not straight
forward.

Its negative sign here suggests that younger children in

rich families are at a disadvantage compared to older children.

Age

-53-

TABLE 5
Are Birth-Order Effects Due to Imperfect Capital Msrkets?
Child Education Regressions for High-Income Families (top 20 percent)
(Non-working mothers)
Ct-statistics in parentheses)
Families with at
least 2 children, N= 798

Families with at
least 3 children, N= 743
(J)
(4)

1. 89
( 18. 8)

1.69
(15.0)

(1)

Constant

FRTD

(2)

2.67
(17.0)

0.146

.178

0.216

( 1. 68)

.228

( 2. 09)

( 2. 40)

( 2. 58)

0.292
( 2. 67)

.180
( 1.64)

-.570
(-3. 48)

(-4. 33)

LSTD
ARAT

2.41
( 13. 8)

-.786
(-5.04)

-.860
( -4. 4~)

-.704

AGE

-.0660
( -6. 67)

-.0537
(-5.36)

SEXD

-.00178
( -0. 02)

-.0490
(-0.76)

R2 =.0891

-54has no effect when entered in the same way into a regression including
children of all nonworking mothers (analogous to the Table 4 regression,
not shown).

Thus the disadvantage of younger children in rich families

does not hold across the population.

This is consistent with the idea

that young children in poorer families benefit more from time and even
financial inputs of older siblings.
Table 6 provides a similar test of the extent to which it is
imperfection in capital markets (rather than the time constraint)
which causes birth-order effects.

Children of nonworking mothers

of all families, regardless of income, are included, and interaction
terms of income and the birth-order dummies are included to test the
effect of income on the extent of birth-order differences.

The sig

nificantly negative coefficient on ISTYIID (interaction of last-born
dummy and income) in column 2 is consistent with the Table 5 results
for the highest-income families.

The advantage of being last-born is

not as great in high-income families, though its net effect is still
positive.
Finally, does the effect of mother's education on differences
among children by birth-order differ depending upon whether the woman
is working or not?

If a working woman's education is positively

correlated with an increase over time in her wage (i.e. not only with
her wage level but with the steepness of her age-earnings profile),
then we would expect more education to be associated with a greater
attenuation of the last-born's advantage among working women than
nonworking women.

(This could also be the case if many women currently

working had only recently entered the labor market.)

Also, insofar

as for working women, their own education is a close measure of the
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TABLE 6
Child Education Regressions: Effect of Income
on Birth-Order Differences
(Non-working mothers)
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Families with at
least 2 children,
N = J815
1

Constant

l.J6
( J6. 4)

FRTD

.OJ58
( 0. 98)

YH (head's income)a
( X 10- 4 )
FRTYHD

(first-born x head's income)
( X 10- 4 )

2

1. 32
( JO .1)

.075
( 2. 00)

.193
(J.49)

LSTD

ARAT

Families with at
least J children,
N = J6J2

-.598
(11.9)

-.567
(-10.7)

.417

.463

( 6. lJ)

( 5. 89)

.140
( 0. 54)

-.0759
( -0. 52)

-.J46
LSTYHD
(last-born x head's income)
( X 10- 4 )

(-2.JJ)

\iean income of head in this sample is 1055 pesos (quarterly income).
Thus net effect of being first-born (at mean of income) is about .08
(column 1), .07 (column 2); net effect of being last-born is .16 (column J).

-56shadow price of their time, whereas for nonworking women, husband's
.
. a c1oser measure,~l we wou
. ld predict
.
.
.reduces
income
is
that education
the last-born's advantage more (or increases it less) among working
women.
Table 7 shows the results of a regression on child education,
with schooling of wife (SCW) and interactions of wife's schooling and
the birth-order dummies (FRTSCWD, LSTSCWD) added to the variables
shown in above tables; the regression is shown for all women in
column 1, for nonworking women in column 2, and for working women
in column J.

The total difference is summarized in Table 8, which

shows that the total effect of being first-born or last-born is much
greater among children of nonworking mothers, as seen in earlier
regressions above.

But the coefficients in Table 7 indicate that

much of the difference in the extent of birth-order effects between
children of working and nonworking mothers is governed by the differ
ential effects of education between the two groups.

For working

mothers, the direct positive effect of mother's education on child
achievement is greater; but for first-borns of working mothers the
greater mother's education, the more is that advantage offset.

The

direct effect of being last-born is not positive for children of
either set of mothers; but among children of nonworking mothers, the
greater mother's education, the greater becomes the last-barn's
advantage.

Both results suggest that the price of time of working

mothers is increasing over time, and the more so the greater their
education.

The nonworking mother education effect for the last-born

51see fn.41 above.
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TABLE 7
Effect of }.bther's Education on Birth-Order Differences;
W0rking and Nonworking I.:::ithers with
at Least 3 Children
Dependent variable: child's educational index
( t-statistics in parentheses)
All mothers,
N = 4082
( 1)
Constant

FRTD
LSTD

.804
(15.6)

Nonworking mothers,
N = 3632
2

.819
( 15. 0)
.0808

.0971
(1. 66)

( 1. 29)

.0177
( 0. 20)

.0252
( 0. 26)

ARAT

-.367
(-7.34)

-.359
(-6.83)

sew

.0681
(16.3)

.0649
(14.6)

FRTSCWD

-.00799
(-1.04)

-.00404
(-0.49)

LSTSCWD

.0119
(1.12)
R2 =.1321

.0134
( 1. 20)

. R2 = .1269

Working mothers,
N = 450
3

.734
(4.71)
.210
( 1. 29)

-.049
(-0.18)
-.475
(-2. 82)
.0905
(7.65)
-.0376
(-1. 73)

.00121
( 0. 03)
R2 =.1857

TABLE 8

Net birth-order differences by mother's education*
( at mean education; families with at least J children)
All mothers
mean education=6 .29

Nonworking mothers
mean education=6 .J2

Working mothers
mein education=6 .02

Net effect of being first-born

.0468a

.0553c

-.0164e

Net effect of being last-born

.0925b

.1099d

-,0417f
I

a

V,

.0971 - .00799 (6.29)

b.0177
C

+

.0119

(6.29)

=

.0468

=

.09~~~i

.0808 - .00404 (6.32) = .055J

a.0252

+

.0134

( 6. 32 ) = .1099

e.210

- .0376

(6.02) =-.0164

f

-.049

+

.00121 (6.02) =-.0417

*Source is Table 7.

0)

I

-59could also be interpreted as a learning-by-doing phenomenon:

women

improve at childrearing with experience, and improve more the greater
their education; this helps the last-born children of nonworking
mothers, but not those of working mothers.
Insofar as women's labor force status is endogenous, and is
especially likely to be related to fertility, these education effects
must be interpreted with caution.

They are shown primarily as

suggestive of what we might expect if the data permitted a better
test.

(The mean of the variable ARAT for working women with at least

3 children is .656 [s.d.:
women .689 [s.d.:

.238], very close to that for nonworking

.277].)

For nonworking women, income effects (where income is that of
the husband) seem a better measure of mother's opportunity cost of
time than education.

Table 9 shows the results of the same regression

for nonworking (column 2) and working (column 3) women.
of Table 7 for education are reversed for income.

The effects

The interaction

of income and last-born is negative for nonworking mothers (see also
Table 6 and discussion there).

Thus nonworking women may also

experience some increase in the price of their time which reduces the
last-barn's advantage--but for them this effect is picked up by the
variable representing the husband's income.
Conclusions
There is evidence that first and last-born children in this
sample have an advantage over middle-barns; among children whose
mothers do not work, first-borns score about 6 percent higher than
middle-barns, and last-borns about 15 percent higher than rniddle-borns
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TABLE 9
Effect of Husband's Income on Birth-Order Differences;
Working ancl Nonworking l.iathers with
at Least 3 Children
Dependent variable: child's educational index
(t-statistics in parentheses)

Constant

FRTD

All mothers,
N = 4082
( 1)

Nonworking mothers,
N = 3632
2

1. 33
( 31. 9)

1.32
( 30 .1)

.069
( 1. 95)

LSTD

YH (x 10- 3 )

1.08
(7.60)

.0755
( 2. 00)

.124
( 0. 98)

(J. 24)

.193
(3.49)

-.0483
(-0. 27)

-.586
( -11. 58)

-.567
(-10. 68)

.168

ARAT

Working mothers,
N = 450
3

-.572
( -3. 34)

.0513
(6.58)

.0463
( 5. 89)

.370
( 6. 01)

FRTYH ( x 10- 3 )

-.0103
(-0.71)

-.00759
(-0. 52)

-.163
(-1.29)

10- 3 )

-.0354
(-2. 39)

-.0346
(-2.JJ)

( O. 23)

R2 =.0586

R2 =.0576

R2 =.1455

LSTYH ( x

.0341

-61on an age-standardized index of educational attainment.

These figures

represent respectively about 6 and 14 percent of one standard deviation
of the educational index.

Results are suggestive, though not definitive;

the predicted birth-order effects do not show up within family size
classes and are much less strong when a different agestandardization procedUJ'e is used.
As predicted, differences by birth order disappear among
children of working mothers.

But the empirical results of testing

the working mother hypothesis cannot be deemed definitive, since labor
force participation of mothers should not be treated as exogenous as
it is here, and since only mothers' cUJ'rent labor force status is known,
whereas the relevant variable to test the model would be labor force
status of mothers throughout the childrearing period.

The hypothesis

that birth-order effects will not obtain among children of working
mothers needs to be tested with better data from other settings.
The advantage of the last-born in these data is notable.
Results suggest the last-born's advantage is greatest in poorer
families; time and financial inputs of older siblings may be important
in poor families, and whatever imperfection in capital markets exists
would work more to the advantage of the last than the first, especially
if parents' earnings increase with age.

The advantage of the last

born distinguishes these data from that of most studies of persons
in the U.S. and Europe.

In Colombia, educational opportunities have

expanded greatly from one generation to the next.

If older children's

education exceeds that of parents, the value of older siblings' help
with younger ones may be important.

-62There is some indication that for working mothers, their own
education captures best their price of time, whereas for nonworking
mothers, husband's income is a better proxy.
Progress toward explaining birth-order effects is made.time constraint faced by mothers seems central.

The

The "economic" explana

tion offered in the sociological and psychological literature to explain
the first-born's advantage is that family money resources are depleted
successively with additional children; findings above suggest the true
"economics" has to do with the price of time, since birth-order effects
are prominent and actually greater in high-income families.

The birth

order model makes explicit the time constraint parents face in raising
children.

The empirical results imply that time inputs to children,

which in certain cases depend partly on their order of birth, do matter.

APPENDIX

A

BIRTH-ORDEn t.lODEL, WllP.EIN\~ MOTHER VERSION, WITH

n CHILDREN, m PERIODS, AND r EFFICIENCY PARAJ..~TER...S

There are 2nr + 3m + 2 first-order conditions, with Al ... Am
the Lagrangean multipliers corresponding to the time constraint in each
period, and Am+l the Lagrangean corresponding to the income constraint.
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From first-order conditions 2nr+l to 2nr+m, it is clear that

••• m

so that

and there are no birth-order effects.

APPENDIX

B

PROOF OF BIRTH-ORDER EFFECTS IN THE Nl1NWORKING MOTHER VERSION

To show that, for the 3-children, 4-periods, 2-efficiency
parameters case, A4 <Al< A2 = A3 (given the restrictions (i) and

(j) in the text, pp. 28-29):
Note that:

If Al> A2 , tsl < ts 2 from first-order conditions (13) and (14),
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For the case of 2 efficiency parameters, but m periods:

For the case of 3 efficiency parameters, and m periods:
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